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This paper addresses in a duopoly framework the incentives to disclose in-
formation about an innovation (a trade secret) that a ﬁrm has elected not to
patent. The following features are crucial to the disclosure decision: The trade
secret holder might be excluded from using her innovation if a second inventor
were to obtain a valid patent for a similar technology. Because patent appli-
cations are reviewed in light of the prior art,rival patents are more diﬃcult to
obtain the more the trade secret holder discloses. But disclosures to invalidate
a subsequent patent must convey technical knowledge that the rival can freely
use in her rediscovery activities. My analysis leads to following conclusions:
First,a more proﬁtable trade secret may result in a higher equilibrium level
of disclosures. Second,a more permissive patent policy has an ambiguous ef-
fect on the disclosure decision. Third,the more complex the i nnovation is the
smaller are the incentives to disclose useful information. Finally,by comparing
the equilibrium level of disclosure with the level that maximizes (expected) to-
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Secrets and patents are two of the most common means inventors employ to protect their
intellectual assets. Empirical evidence - see Cohen, Nelson and Walsh [2] for instance -
strongly suggests that secrecy has become one of the most heavily employed mechanisms
in several industries in the US. Secrecy is widely used, for instance, in semiconductors,
machine tools, aerospace and chemical equipments. Lerner [4], examining the importance
of various methods of intellectual property protection for a sample of manufacturing ﬁrms,
reports that for smaller ﬁrms trade secret protection is critical for appropriating the re-
turns of their R&D programs.1 Although patenting is viewed as less important than
secrecy, patents among large ﬁrms have the highest eﬀectiveness score as appropriation
mechanisms. The bottom line is that for some type of ﬁrms patents are eﬀective as a
means to capture innovative rents, while for others secrecy is the best option to protect
their intellectual endeavors.
In spite of their increasing importance, the major drawback of secrets is that innovators
cannot prevent subsequent ﬁrms from independently rediscovering the invention, patenting
it and knocking the ﬁrst inventor out of the market.
In this paper I focus on the defensive maneuvers that owners of trade secrets employ to
mitigate the risks of patenting activities conducted by subsequent inventors. In particular,
I examine the decision of a trade secret owner concerning disclosures of an innovation to
invalidate potential future patents for competing technologies. Thus by analyzing how
the rights of patentees to exclude “prior” - rather than “subsequent” - inventors aﬀect
the decision to disclose an innovation, I adopt a diﬀerent perspective from the innovation
literature2.
1Lanjouw and Schankerman’s [3] found that the burden of enforcing patent rights is more severe for
certain type of patentees. They suggest that the beneﬁts of litigating one patent spill over to the protection
of other patents through reputation eﬀects. Therefore, high enforcement costs appear to be a prevalent
feature for small startup ﬁrms with insuﬃcient experience in dealing with patent disputes.
2To the best of my knowledge, only Denicolo and Franzoni [6] have studied the relationship between
patents and secrecy. Nevertheless, their focus is on optimal patent design when innovators can rely on
secrecy to protect their innovations.
1Three features of the economic and legal environment are crucial to understand the
disclosure decision. First, trade secret users might be excluded from practicing their inno-
vations if second inventors obtain a valid patent for similar technologies. Second, the fact
that patent applications are reviewed in light of the prior art provide incentives to ﬁrst in-
ventors to strategically disclose some details of their ﬁndings in order to enlarge prior art.3
Third, disclosures to invalidate subsequent patents must also convey technical knowledge
that competitors can freely use in their rediscovery activities. The simultaneous problem
of disclosing to enlarge prior art at the cost of enhancing the duplication capabilities of a
rival is the heart of this paper.4
I frame my analysis in a duopoly model where one ﬁrm, the innovator, has elected
to keep her innovation a secret and a second ﬁrm invests in duplication activities to
obtain a similar invention. If the rediscovery process is a success, the second ﬁrm will
attempt to patent the invention. This built-in asymmetry between the ﬁrms’ choice of
intellectual property protection might seem, at ﬁrst, a little strange because it is natural
to thinkthat the ﬁrst inventor should also rely on patents. Nevertheless, this asymmetry
is based on the stylized facts about the remarkable heterogeneity of intellectual property
protection in most industries: secrets are widely used by ﬁrms whose costs of detecting
misappropriation and enforcing their patent rights are signiﬁcant. Besides, it is not the
purpose of this paper to study the choice of intellectual property protection. And from a
formal point of view, this assumption allows me to isolate the major drawbackof using
secrets to capture innovative rents.
Given my simple duopoly framework, I show that a pure strategy equilibrium exists
and establish its fundamental properties. In particular, my analysis leads to ﬁve main
3Prior art can be considered as all the public knowledge that existed prior to the ﬁling of a patent
application
4It is important to notice that the model and results below are valid for cases in which knowledge is
protected either through trade secrets - l egalrights - or informalsecrecy - de facto rights -. If knowl edge
were protected by trade secret law, in the US, subsequent inventors’ patents would be considered valid
by courts in most cases and ﬁrst inventors do not have prior user rights. Even if ﬁrst inventors had prior
user rights, they should also demonstrate that they had discovered the innovation earlier. In most cases,
a printed publication may be enough for this purpose.
2results. First, a higher premium for technological leadership - that is a higher diﬀerence in
the proﬁts obtained by being the exclusive user of the innovation compared to a duopolis-
tic explotation of it - may result in a higher equilibrium level of disclosures. The intuition
behind this somewhat paradoxical result is easy to understand. A higher premium weak-
ens the incentives to disclose by increasing the forgone proﬁts when the rival duplicates.
Nevertheless, a greater market premium, by making replication eﬀorts more proﬁtable,
increases the rediscovery probability. This improves the beneﬁts of disclosing, because
disclosures only beneﬁt the ﬁrst inventor when her rival duplicates the invention.5 Under
these circumstances an increase in the market premium may lead to a higher disclosure
level.
Second, the greater the additional proﬁts the innovator reaps by successfully avoiding
a rival’s patent, the higher the equilibrium level of disclosures. This result conﬁrms the
intuition that in environments where competition is less intense the room for information
transmission is enlarged.
Third and counterintuitive, a more permissive patent policy - that is the chances of
the second inventor of obtaining a valid patent are greater for any given disclosure level -
has an ambiguous eﬀect on the equilibrium level of disclosures. The intuition behind this
is as follows. On one hand, disclosures become more costly because their eﬀect on the
second ﬁrm’s patenting possibilities is diminished. But on the other hand, a “pro-patent”
shift in public policy induces higher duplication eﬀorts. This acts as an opposing force to
the ﬁrst one, by increasing the attractiveness of disclosures.
Fourth, an increase in the technical complexity of the innovation causes the equilibrium
level of disclosures to diminish. The reason for this is twofold. First, the second inventor
will react devoting fewer resources to duplication activities because - for more complex
innovations - her rediscovery cost increases. Therefore, by diminishing the threat of du-
plication, a more technically complex innovation weakens the importance of disclosures
5This is obviously true because if the second inventor duplicates the innovation, he will try to obtain a
patent.
3to dissuade patenting activities. Second, the marginal cost of disclosing is also higher be-
cause, for a more diﬃcult technical problem, the contribution of the knowledge contained
in the disclosure becomes more productive for duplication activities.
Finally, I compare the equilibrium level of disclosure with the level that maximizes
(expected) total surplus. I show that in equilibrium there may be too much or too little
disclosure. This can be easily explained for the particular case of a drastic innovation.6
In this case, the natural intuition is that given the total surplus does not change whether
duplication is a success or not, disclosures have no “social” beneﬁts but only eﬀects on
the distribution of property rights between the ﬁrms. Thus an appealing conjecture is
that in equilibrium there is too much disclosure. Nevertheless this intuition is incorrect.
Disclosures have also positive external eﬀects because they decrease the costs associated
with duplication activities and as a result the equilibrium may involve too little disclosure.
Also, notice that the result that, under some circumstances, there is too much disclosure
contradicts the natural conjecture that knowledge, as a pure public good, should be com-
pletely shared between the ﬁrms.
The model and results below rest on the basic notion that the validity of the second
inventor’s patent is strongly aﬀected by prior art and judiciary discretion. In general,
establishing that a patent is invalid amounts to showing that the invention that this
protects is not novel. Courts have ruled that, in some circumstances, a printed publication
accessible to the public is enough to invalidate a patent. Allison and Lemley [1] found
that once a patent has been issued, the chance that a court will hold it valid is only
slightly better than even. Also, the majority of the grounds for invalidity are rooted in
prior art. At the other extreme, in Gillman v. Stern, see Merger [5], the court held
that the inventor did not take any steps to make his invention publicly known. The
court concluded the invention could not be considered prior art and did not invalidate the
second inventor’s patent. Similarly, in Gore v. Garlok the judiciary decision was that the
6In this context, an innovation is “drastic” if when only one ﬁrm uses it, then market competition
results in monopoly.
4secret commercial exploitation of a new process did not invalidate a subsequent patent.
Nevertheless, in Dunlop v Ram, see Denicolo and Franzoni [6], the court invalidated a
second inventor’s patent based on the fact that the product manufactured by the prior
user had been distributed earlier to the public.
The extent of the enabling knowledge, contained in the disclosure, is the other key
ingredient to understand the revelation decision. A recent series of newspaper articles
anecdotally describes the widespread use of this tactic to protect innovations.7 In par-
ticular, it is underscored that to dilute the transfer of enabling knowledge to competitors
“ﬁrms often publish anonymously, and they sometimes use vague language to describe an
invention”. Nevertheless, the risks associated with this practice are that “...if competitors
are unable to understand an idea, there is a good chance that patent examiners will not
either”. Another example of the disclosure - duplication game ﬁrms play in innovative
markets is oﬀered by Milgrim [7]. A French company developed and kept secret a process
for producing cellophane. Du Pont spent many years and millions of dollars trying to
replicate or develop a similar technology. Finally, Du Pont gave up and obtained a license
from the French company. As this illustrates, the technical complexity of innovations is
an obstacle that might result in the most important barrier to duplicate new techniques.
Related Theoretical Studies
The role of disclosures in innovative settings has also been analyzed by Anton and Yao
[1]. In their model, using a strategic substitute setting, knowledge is disclosed in a patent
of uncertain validity. The main forces that shape strategic disclosures are the extent of
the knowledge potentially transferred to the competitor and the signal that the patent
sends about the total private knowledge relevant for downstream competition. My model
has several diﬀerent features. First, disclosures are made by a trade secret owner only
to vitiate the validity of future patents. Second, in my setting information is complete
7“Suddenly, ’Idea Wars’ Take On a New Global Urgency” The New York Times.....and “Protecting
Intellectual Property” The New York Times 02/18/2002.
5and symmetric and the incentives to disclose are not crucially aﬀected by the nature of
downstream competition.
Also, Anton and Yao [2] examine the choice between patents and secrecy to protect a
process innovation. The amount of the information disclosed in the patent is one of the
crucial ingredients to understand the property right choice. One of the main conclusions
is that large or economically important innovations are protected through secrecy when
property rights are weak. Although my focus is not on the choice of intellectual property
rights, my model suggest that under some circumstances the incentives to disclose are
enhanced for important innovations. This result is due to the fact that, in my model,
subsequent ﬁrms can rediscover the invention, patent it and knock the ﬁrst inventor out
of the market.
Battacharya and Ritter [3] study an environment in which partial disclosure of tech-
nical information reduces the cost of capital to a ﬁrm competingin a R&D race, but
generates additional entry into that race. My model diﬀers from Battacharya and Ritter
by focusingon disclosures of te chnical information about an innovation that has already
been discovered but that might be subsequently duplicated.
Green and Scotchmer [7] focus on the impact that the requirements of novelty and
nonobviousness have on both the incentives to innovate and to disclose intermediate dis-
coveries in a multistage race. In their case, partial disclosure is not allowed, and knowledge
can be interpreted as an indivisible commodity. Furthermore, they conclude that ﬁrms
may be reluctant to disclose intermediate discoveries because they can not appropriate the
cost advantages that disclosure provides to competitors in subsequent stages. Although, I
do not analyze a multistage race, in my model the ﬁrm’s incentive to disclose are rooted in
the possibility of invalidatingfuture patents by strateg ically creatingprior art, an aspect
that is absent in their analysis.
Denicolo and Franzoni [6] analyze optimal patent design when innovators can rely on
secrecy to protect their innovations. And even though they do not consider the possibility
of disclosures by trade secret owners, the heart of their paper and mine is the rights granted
6by patents to exclude “prior” rather than “subsequent” inventors. Finally, Severinov [8]
also investigates the issue of information sharing in R&D context through information
exchange between employees. He focuses on the incentives of ﬁrms, in a duopoly game,
to regulate communication ﬂows through incentive contracts. My problem diﬀers from
Severinov in several aspects. First, I do not consider issues related to agency problems
and in my model only one ﬁrm - the one that has superior knowledge - has the option
to disclose. Second and important, my results are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from his ﬁndings.
To illustrate, he ﬁnds that a higher premium for technological leadership always provide
incentives to withholdinformation transmission. Nevertheless, I ﬁnd that under some cases
a higher technological premium may result in a higher equilibrium level of disclosures
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets forth the basics of my
model. In section 3 the existence of equilibrium is established. In section 4, I characterize
the equilibrium and discuss the economic properties of the disclosure strategies. Section 5
characterizes the level of disclosures that maximize expected total surplus. Finally, section
6 contains concludingremarks.
2 The Model
A ﬁrm, denoted by A, has obtained a certain innovation. It might be either a new tech-
nique that lowers the unit cost of production or an innovation that improves the quality
of a given commodity.8 I start by assuming that A has elected trade secrets to protect her
innovation. A second ﬁrm, denoted by B, could duplicate or rediscover the innovation by
using a stochastic invention technology. To capture the fundamental trade-oﬀ discussed in
the Introduction, I suppose that if the innovation were successfully duplicated, B would
attempt to obtain a patent. This basic asymmetry between the players’ choice of intellec-
tual property protection allows me to understand the basic interactions between patents,
secrets and disclosures.
8Secrecy is often used for process rather than for product innovations. In this sense, the model describes
more closely a process innovation case.
7Firm A must choose a disclosure level, d, from her feasible disclosure set, [0,1].D i s c l o -
sures may be interpreted, for instance, as technological information regarding the newly
innovated technique. Thus d =0 , indicates that A has chosen to keep her innovation
entirely hidden. At the other extreme, when d =1 , the understanding is that the best
possible description of the innovation has been made, given the available publication tech-
nologies - i.e. printed publications, photographs, drawings, etc.-. Partial knowledge trans-
fers, d ∈ (0,1), are similarly interpreted.
In the duplication phase, B has a unique opportunity to use a stochastic technology
to successfully duplicate the innovation. Naturally, the probability of duplication depends
on the innovative eﬀorts taken by ﬁrm B. Nevertheless, the following reparametrization is
a useful shortcut for both simplifying the model and directly emphasizing the role of the
duplication probability in the determination of equilibrium disclosures. To that purpose, I
consider that, instead of eﬀorts, B directly chooses the duplication probability, f ∈ [0,1].
If B’s duplication activities are successful, she will try to obtain an exclusive right to
practice the technology, by relying on patents.
Patents are granted or alternatively they are found valid in courts if the inventions
protected by them are novel and exhibit a suﬃcient “inventive step” - i.e. are non-obvious
-. An invention is considered new if it is not anticipated by prior art, that is if it is not
anticipated by all the knowledge that existed prior to the ﬁling of a patent application
whether it existed by way of written or oral disclosure. The requirement of “inventive
step” conveys the idea that, for owning a valid patent, it is not enough that the claimed
invention is diﬀerent from what existed in prior art - be novel - but that this diﬀerence
must also be noticeable. Although, both novelty and obviousness are diﬃcult to prove,
the validity of a patent depends on the set of all relevant disclosures prior to the ﬁling
of a patent application. Therefore, by disclosing some elements of her innovation, A can
strategically aﬀect the possibilities to B of obtaining a valid patent.
In this paper, I assume that prior to market competition a governmental decision
maker - i.e. (PO) - determines the validity of patents. After that decision, every residual
8uncertainty about patent validity vanishes: if the patent is found valid, B will exclude A
from using her innovated technology in the market competition game.9
Timing of the Disclosure - Duplication (DD) Game
The order of play is as follow,
Stage 1
A chooses a disclosure level, d ∈ [0,1]
Stage 2
B, after observing d, chooses a duplication probability f.
Stage 3
If B rediscovers the innovation, an expert - PO- observes a signal of the true disclosures
made by A. Then a resolution of property rights is made by using a commonly known
property right rule.
Stage 4
A and B engage in duopoly competition.
Equilibrium. The natural equilibrium concept for the DD game is subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE). I concentrate on pure strategy SPNE. Hence, strategic options
are as follows. A strategy for ﬁrm A is a choice of disclosure, d, from the feasible disclosure
set [0,1]. A strategy for B is a real-valued function f :[ 0 ,1] −→ [0,1]. The pair of
strategies (d,f) is a SPNE for the game if it induces a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame
of DD game
2.1 Market Competition Stage
The payoﬀs ﬁrms obtain in the market competition game depend on the duplication and
patenting outcomes. In general, each possible event is represented by a pair (D,P), with
9Notice that although I do not make any distinction between the process of awarding patents and the
challenges to their validity frequently made by competitors, the modeling assumption that the decision
about a patent’s validity is considered before market competition corresponds, for instance, to a patent
reexamination request. This type of procedure deals mainly with issues of patentability related to prior
patents and printed publications.
9the ﬁrst element in the pair standing for the result of the duplication activities and the
second one for the property right resolution. For example, the pair (S,F) represents the
event in which duplication is a success, but B fails to obtain a valid patent. The following
table represents the ﬁrms’ payoﬀs for each possible event:




Notice that for disclosures to be possible in equilibrium, the proﬁts for ﬁrm A when
both competitors use the technology, π22, must be strictly greater than the proﬁts the ﬁrm
obtains when she is excluded from exploiting the innovation, π12. Therefore, I assume
that the payoﬀs satisfy the following ordering structure: π21 >π 22 >π 12 ≥ 0. This payoﬀ
structure is satisﬁed, for instance, for the cases of Cournot and Stackelberg leadership
competition. However, these conditions are not met for the case of price competition.
2.2 Patent Decisions Stage
Faced with a property right resolution, Iassume that PO observes a signal of the true
disclosures made by A. This observation is given by
s = d +υ
where υ ∈ [a,b] and hence s ∈ Σ=[ d +a,d +b].
The assumption that PO observes a signal of the true disclosures captures the idea
that the resolution of a patent’s validity is based not only on disclosures but also on
other important legal features, such as previous ruling in similar disputes and judiciary
discretion10.
10Alternatively, it is easy to imagine that some intrinsic measurement error is involved in the observation
of disclosures made by the patent oﬃce and courts.
10A patent decision is chosen from the set of possible property rights resolutions Ω=
{V,NV}, where V - i.e. validity - must be understood as a resolution in favor of a valid
patent for B. An element of Ω is chosen using a property right rule, P :Σ→ Ω with the
following features




Notice that the decisions about a patent’s validity are crucially inﬂuenced by both
the “measurement error” υ, and the exogenously given cutoﬀvalue,
−
s ≥ 0. Bigger values
for υ might be interpreted, for example, as positive opinions about disclosures and hence
as “good” news for A. On the other hand, a bigger
−
s reduces the strategic eﬀects of
disclosures on property rights decisions.
When A and B must execute their plans, their information about the measurement
error, υ, is incorporated in the following common prior distribution, GV (υ) for υ ∈ [a,b]
with associated density
∂GV (υ)
∂υ = gV (υ).
The following lemma formalizes, in terms of stochastic dominance, the intuition that
higher disclosures lower the chances to B of obtaining a patent.
Lemma 1. a) For a ﬁxed d ∈ [0,1], the probability ﬁrms attach to the event P(s)=V
is given by the cdf γ(d;
−
s) = GV (
−
s −d).
b) The location family of cdfs {GV (s− d),d∈ [0,1]}is stochastically increasing in d.
Proof: See the Appendix.
I suppose that a<
−
s<1+b. This assumption is made to avoid trivial cases. For
example, if
−
s ≤ a, then no matter the level of disclosures, B w i l ln e v e rb ea b l et og e ta
patent.
More important, I assume that
Assumption 1. γ(d;
−








Additionally, I impose on γ(d;
−
s) the following two properties,
11Property 1. γ(d =0 ;
−
s) ≤ 1,a n d
Property 2. γ(d =1 ;
−
s) ≥ 0
Property 1 says that even when there are no disclosures, the probability of obtaining
a patent might be less than one. Similarly, property 2 maintains that full disclosures are
not enough to completely prevent property rights resolutions in favor of B. Finally, notice
that together, properties 1 and 2, determine that
−
s ∈ [1 + a,b].
Example 1. Suppose that beliefs about the random component, υ, are uniformly
distributed between a and b and let β ≡ b − a. Then, it is easy to check that properties
1 and 2 are satisﬁed if and only if β ≥ 1. In this simple case, the probability of patenting
is given by γ(d;a,b,
−
s) =1− (β)−1(d +b −
−
s) for 1+a ≤
−
s ≤ b. And in the special case
of β =1 , we have the simple linear probability function γ(d)=1−d.
2.3 Duplication Stage
The process of duplication involves a choice of R&D eﬀorts by ﬁrm B. Equivalently, as I
discussed before, it can be considered that instead of eﬀorts, B chooses directly the proba-
bility of rediscovery, f ∈ [0,1]. Greater knowledge, emerging from information disclosures
by A is valuable in that it reduces the private cost to B of achieving a given probabil-
ity of duplication. Let C(f,d) denote the private cost to B of achieving a duplication
probability f, when the operating disclosure is d. C(f,d) is assumed to be a diﬀeren-
tiable, non-negative, increasing and strictly convex function11,i . e .∀(f,d) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1]
C(f,d) ≥ 0,C f(f,d) ≥ 0,C ff(f,d) > 0 and also that ∀d ∈ [0,1] C(0,d)=0 ,C f(0,d)=0 .
With a higher disclosure level, it is assumed that both the total and marginal cost to
B of achieving a given f are lower, i.e. ∀f ∈ [0,1] Cd(f,d) < 0,C fd(f,d) < 0.
After observing any d ∈ [0,1], B chooses the duplication probability, f, to maximize
her expected payoﬀ. Notice that with probability (1 − f) duplication is a failure and
the proﬁts B obtains are equal to π12. With complementary probability, f, B duplicates
11All derivates are denoted by subscripts.
12the innovation. In this case, two diﬀerent situations are possible. First, with probability
γ(d;
−
s), she gets a patent and appropriates π21. And second, with probability (1−γ(d;
−
s)),
both ﬁrms use the innovation. In this case, both of them get π22.T h u s ,i fB duplicates
the innovation, her expected payoﬀ is γ(d;
−
s)π21 +( 1− γ(d;
−







s))π22−π12 - where π =( π21,π 22,π 12) - represents the
(expected) extra proﬁts the second inventor obtains in the case of successful duplication.
Given that the ﬁrm gets π12 and has to pay the positive duplication costs, C(f,d), whether
duplication is a success or not, the expected payoﬀ for ﬁrm B can be written as,
EUB = π12 +fRB(d,π,
−
s) − C (f,d)
To avoid corner solutions when d =0 , I assume both that the maximum value function
W(d,π)=Maxf∈[0,1]
￿
RBf − C (f,d)|d =0
￿
> 0 and Cf (1,0) = ∞.
More important is the following assumption,
Assumption 2. Cf (1,1) >R B(d,π,
−
s) for all d ∈ [0,1]
This assumption captures the idea that even with full disclosure, B would optimally
choose an f<1. In other words, this assumption guarantees that selecting to rediscover
the innovation with probability one is not proﬁtable from an economic point of view,
because expected returns are relatively small with respect to the duplication costs12.
Under this assumption, the optimal duplication probability by B is determined by the
following necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst order condition (FOC),
γ(d;
−
s)(π21 −π22)+( π22 − π12) − Cf (f,d)=0 (1)
Notice that (π21−π22) are the extra proﬁts ﬁrm B attains by excluding her competitor
in the use of the innovation. In other words, this is the most B would pay to avoid sharing
12Assumption 1 can easily be relaxed without altering any of our results. If there were a
−
d ∈ (0,1) such
that for ∀d ≥
−
d, f
∗ =1 , then A would not choose any d ∈ [
−
d,1). Hence optimal disclosures, d
∗ ∈ [0,d)∪{1}
and the same analysis done in sections 4 and 5 completly holds.
13the new technology with A.F r o mB’s point of view, this is the marginal contribution of
the patent, i.e. (π21−π22)=∆ P. Hence γ(d;
−
s)(π21−π22) = E∆P is the private expected
marginal contribution of the patent. On the other hand, (π22−π12) are the extra proﬁts B
appropriates by using the innovation when A is also exploiting it. From B’s perspective,
(π22 −π12) is the marginal contribution of the invention, i.e. π22 −π12 =∆ I. Therefore,
the (FOC) is equivalent to
E∆P +∆ I −Cf(f,d)=0 (2)
Equation (2) shows that B will increase the probability of duplication up to the point
at which the joint (expected) marginal contribution of the patent and the innovation equals
the marginal cost.
But the (FOC) also demonstrates that disclosures weaken the probability of obtaining
a patent and therefore, they decrease E∆P. Consequently, by releasing innovative knowl-
edge, A changes both B’s private cost and beneﬁts of investing in duplication activities.
Lemma 2 formalizes these basic eﬀects of disclosures.
Lemma 2. a) B’s best response exists and it is a C1 function f(d,
−
s,π) where π =
(π21,π22,π12).























Proof: See the Appendix.
Part b) of Lemma 2 shows that the duplication probability could either be lower
or higher as a result of increasing knowledge transfers. What yields this result is the
14combination of two opposing forces: a positive technological spillover eﬀect and a negative
pecuniary eﬀect. The ﬁrst eﬀect is captured by the lower marginal cost to B of obtaining
any given f,i . e . b y−Cfd, and the second one,
∂E∆P
∂d ,c o rrespond to a lower expected
return to B because her chances of obtaining a patent are reduced when disclosures become
higher.
In this paper, I concentrate on the case in which higher disclosures unambiguously
improve the duplication probability. Hence it is assumed that,
Assumption 3. ∀(f,d) ∈ [0,1] ×[0,1] ∂E∆P
∂d −Cfd > 0
For technical convenience, I also assume that,
Assumption 4. Cffd =0and Cfdd < 0.13
This last assumption says, that the rate at which the marginal cost increases is in-
dependent of the level of disclosures and the rate at which the marginal cost decreases
with disclosures is itself a decreasing function of innovative knowledge. The best response
probability function for ﬁrm B is completely characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. a) Under assumption 3, B’s best response, f, is a monotonically increasing
function of disclosures.
b) Under assumption 4, f is a C2 strictly convex function of disclosures.
Proof: See the Appendix
2.4 Disclosure Stage
Firm A must choose a disclosure level that belongs to the feasible disclosure set, antici-










(f,d) ∈ [0,1] ×[0,1] : γ(d;
−
s)∆P +∆ I −Cf (f,d)=0
￿





s)π12 +( 1− γ(d;
−
s))π22. A’s problem reﬂects the basic
trade-oﬀ of disclosing innovative knowledge: by releasing valuable information, the prob-
ability of exclusively exploiting the innovation, (1 − f), is reduced. But if the discovery
were independently obtained the chances of obtaining a bigger payoﬀ, RA, - i.e. not being
excluded of using the improved technology in the market competition game - would be
higher.
3 Equilibrium
In this section, I establish the existence of equilibrium for the DD game and analyze
suﬃcient conditions under which the equilibrium involves partial information transmission.
Although much of the characterization of the equilibrium is provided in the next section,
here I discuss some basic insights about the economic principles that determine equilibrium
disclosures.
The existence of an equilibrium for the DD is equivalent to establish that the problem
for the disclosing ﬁrm -i.e. the problem deﬁned in the disclosure stage -has a solution.
The following is the basic existence theorem.
Theorem 1. a) A pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists.
b) Suppose that the payoﬀ function of the disclosing ﬁrm, EUA(f,d) , is quasiconcave, i.e.






s))2. Then the equilibrium is unique.14
Proof: See the Appendix
When does the equilibrium entails partial disclosures? Proposition 1 formalizes the
basic economic principles under which null disclosures are impossible in equilibrium.
14Showing that EU








2is a straightforward proof that I omit.
16Proposition 1. Let α ≡
(π21−π22)









s)∆P +∆ I − Cf(f,d)
Then, absence of disclosures is impossible in equilibrium.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The second equation of Proposition 1 states that the f used in the ﬁrst condition is
B’s optimal response to a zero disclosure strategy played by A. More relevant, the ﬁrst
condition allows us to consider some of the factors determining whether the innovator will
completely prevent disclosures or not.
What Proposition 1 conﬁrms is the intuitive idea that a high probability of rediscovery,
in the absence of disclosures, is a suﬃcient condition to avoid full secrets. In other words,
owners of “easy” innovations - i.e. a suﬃciently high f - are tempted to disclose, at least,
partially their ﬁndings. Obviously, a high impact of disclosures over patenting possibilities,
- i.e. a high −γd - and a small marginal eﬀect of leakages on the rediscovery probability -
i.e. a low fd - are factors that contribute to avoid complete secrets.
Also, this Proposition shows that a high probability of patenting, when there are no
disclosures - i.e. a high γ - lowers the proﬁtability of disclosures. This ﬁnding clearly
illustrates the trade-oﬀ involved in the revelation decision: in the case of a suﬃciently
high γ, information revelation would transfer valuable commercial knowledge that with
high probability could be later privatized by a competitor.
Finally, whether α deters or not information revelation should be carefully considered.
A detailed explanation must await the next section.
Similar to Proposition 1, in the next proposition suﬃcient conditions are provided to
avoid full information transmission.
Proposition 2. Let α ≡
(π21−π22)









s)∆P +∆ I − Cf(f,d)
Then, full disclosures are impossible in equilibrium.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 follows similar lines of reasoning to those of Propo-
sition 1 and I do not provide any additional explanations.
In the rest of the paper, I concentrate on the case of partial disclosures. Notice that
an interior equilibrium exist if and only if Propositions 1 and 2 hold simultaneously. In









s))]d=1.15 When do these inequalities are satisﬁed? On one
hand, notice that f]d=0 <f ]d=1 because by Lemma 3, the duplication probability, f,









s))]d=0. By simple algebraic manipulations,
it can be shown that this last inequality is satisﬁed if, for instance, the ratio α/γ]d=0 is
suﬃciently high.16 For the rest of the paper, I assume that the functions f and γ and the
payoﬀ ratio α are such that the above inequalities are satisﬁed.
To study the interior equilibria is useful to introduce the following notation. The
marginal beneﬁt of disclosures will be denoted by MBd and the marginal cost of disclosing
by MCd. The next Corollary, using Propositions 1 and 2, provides suﬃcient conditions
for existence of an interior equilibrium and oﬀers a full characterization of it.
15Obviously, the pair of constraints deﬁning the best response of ﬁrm B must hold at both d =0and
d =1 .




−γd]d=1 ≡ z1because (i) f is a monotonically increasing and strictly

















γ]d=0 > 1. This is satisﬁed, for example,
if
α




s,π) ≡ (π21 − π22)+γ(d,
−
s)(π22 − π12) and assume that Propositions 1 and
2 hold simultaneously. Then the necessary conditions for an interior equilibrium are
MBd ≡ −γd(d;
−








s)∆P +∆ I −Cf(f,d)
The SOC is provided in the appendix.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The second equation implicitly deﬁnes the best response of ﬁrm B to disclosures made
by A and the ﬁrst one deﬁnes the optimal disclosures chosen by A given the optimal
duplication probability function chosen by B. Hence these two equations completely
describe the properties of any interior SPNE.
An alternative way of characterizing an interior equilibrium is by using level sets or
iso-proﬁts curves for ﬁrm A. They describe all the combinations of f and d that keep
(expected) proﬁts for A ﬁxed at some given level. Because an increase in f decreases the
expected payoﬀ to A, d must be increased to keep expected proﬁts at the same level. In












In Figure 1, a typical iso-proﬁt curve - for a payoﬀ function of ﬁrm A strictly quasi-
concave - is drawn. It is also shown the best response of ﬁrm B. At the equilibrium, A
chooses the highest iso-proﬁt curve subject to the constraint given by B’s best response.
It is not diﬃcult to imagine that the equilibrium is characterized by a tangency point of
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And in this case, in which EUA(f,d) is quasiconcave, the equilibrium is unique.
4 Comparative Statics
In this section, I further study the economic properties of the equilibrium and I also un-
derscore the economic motivations that lead to disclosures in the DD game. In particular,
I focus in the following two important factors. First, I analyze how market competition
shapes the optimal disclosure strategy. Second, the eﬀect of patent policy on the opti-
mal disclosure strategy is carefully addressed. For that purpose, it is useful to start by
considering the economic principles that govern the optimal disclosure policy.
On the beneﬁt side, Corollary 1 shows that the higher the optimal probability of
20duplication, f, the bigger the impact of leakages on patenting possibilities, −γd, and the
more important the proﬁt incentives (π22 − π12), the higher the innovator’s gains from
intentional leakages.
The following two observations underscore the intuition behind the above factors.
First, disclosures are employed by ﬁrm A only with the purpose of dissuading patenting
of similar competing innovations by B. But B can only apply for a patent if she replicates
the innovation. Therefore a higher probability of duplication - i.e. a higher f - improves
the returns to disclosing. Second, (π22 −π12) constitutes the market incentives to release
innovative knowledge by capturing the additional proﬁts A obtains by successfully avoiding
patenting activities. This is called the preemptive eﬀect.
On the cost side, disclosures facilitate duplication by transferring enabling knowledge
to B. This eﬀect is formally captured by
∂f
∂d. And given that duplication is an event with






This last expression shows that the preemptive eﬀect also increases the disclosing costs.
The explanation for this is rather simple: when the preemptive eﬀect becomes higher,
(π21 −π12) also increases, making disclosures a less attractive alternative. But Π(d,
−
s,π)
is in addition determined by (π21 − π22). This last expression represents the market
rewards for being the technological leader and it is the most A would be willing to spend
in protecting her trade secrets. This is called the premium eﬀect. When the premium eﬀect
is high, the cost of releasing innovating knowledge is also signiﬁcant; and the intuition is
simple: the scenario in which A appropriates the beneﬁts of having the technological
leadership is less likely to happen when disclosures are high.
Now let me interpret α ≡
(π21−π22)
(π22−π12) as a market payoﬀ ratio measuring the relative
importance of being at the cutting-edge of technological advance compared to the beneﬁts
of preempting the rival’s patenting activities. How does α shape the disclosure strategy?
Does a more intense competition - i.e. a higher α - reduce the incentives to disclose?
Finally, let me emphasize that all the following comparative static results are obtained
21by using the second order condition that must be satisﬁed close to any regular maximum.
Changes in the premium eﬀect
How does a change in the premium for technological leadership aﬀect disclosures?
Intuitively, one expects that when α increases, due to a bigger market premium, disclosures
should diminish: the innovator would be more conservative in her disclosure strategy under
the threat of missing the chance of capturing higher rents for being the technological leader.
Even though this logic seems appealing, Proposition 3 shows that changes in the premium
eﬀect have inconclusive consequences on disclosures.
Proposition 3. An increase in the technological premium has an ambiguous eﬀect on
the equilibrium level of disclosures d∗
Proof: See the Appendix.
The intuition for this proposition is as follows. On one hand, a higher premium eﬀect
weakens the incentives to disclose by increasing the cost of releasing knowledge in two dif-
ferent ways: by rising the forgone proﬁts in case B duplicates - i.e. by increasing Π(d,
−
s,π)
- and by augmenting the marginal eﬀect of disclosures on the duplication probability. This
last eﬀect is just captured by (− ∂
∂∆P
∂f
∂d), and it is always negative. These two eﬀects by
reinforcing to each other make disclosing a less attractive alternative.
However, on the beneﬁt side, increases in the premium eﬀect make duplication more
attractive to B, thereby rising the duplication probability. This last channel, represented
by
∂f
∂∆P > 0, unambiguously improve the beneﬁts of intentional leakages, because the state
of the world in which disclosures are useful - i.e. duplication - becomes more likely.
Under these countervailing eﬀects is impossible to rule out the case in which increases
in the market premium - i.e. a more virulent market competition in the sense of a higher
α - leads to higher knowledge transmission. Conditions that contribute to this provoking
result include a relatively moderate eﬀect of disclosures over the duplication probability
compared to the reaction of the duplication eﬀorts to stronger market incentives.
Changes in the preemptive eﬀect
22When the beneﬁts of preempting the competitor’s patent increases - i.e. a lower α -
one should expect an environment more favorable to disclosures. Although this logic is
conﬁrmed in the following proposition, the intuition is more complicated that it appears
to be and involves several contradicting forces.
Proposition 4. An increase in the preemption rewards causes the equilibrium level
of disclosures d∗ to rise.
Proof: See the Appendix.
This result can easily be explaining using our taxonomy of beneﬁts and cost of disclos-
ing. On the beneﬁt side, two important economic forces encourage disclosures. On one
hand, an increase in (π22 − π12) simply represents the extra proﬁt the ﬁrm appropriates
by obstructing her rival’s patent. On the other hand, and more subtle, an increase in the
preemptive eﬀect tightens the incentives to invest in duplication activities and - as it was
remarked before - this eﬀect encourages leakages by increasing the probability of the state
of the world in which disclosures are advantageous.
However, increases in (π22 − π12) make disclosures more costly by raising the forgone
proﬁts for A in case B duplicates, that is by rising Π(d,
−
s,π).
The proposition shows that ultimately the beneﬁt eﬀects outweigh the cost conse-
quences of increased disclosures and conﬁrms, at least partially, the intuition that in
environments where competition is less intense the room for information transmission is
enlarged.
Changes in patent policy
The attitudes of the PO towards patents and disclosures are crucially inﬂuenced by
the commonly known parameter
−
s. A greater value for
−
s might be interpreted as a shift in
favor of patentees to exclude prior users. Under these circumstances, one may be tempted
to conclude that disclosures should diminish. Contrary to this appealing intuition, the
following proposition highlights that an increase in
−
s, under some conditions, encourages
disclosures.
23Proposition 5. An increase in the rights of patentees to exclude ﬁrst inventors has
an ambiguous eﬀect on the equilibrium level of disclosures d∗
Proof: See the Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is relatively easy to understand. When
−
s increases,
disclosures becomes more costly because their eﬀect on others’ patenting possibilities is





> 0.17 On the other hand,
a bigger value for
−
s improves the perspectives to B of obtaining a patent and induces





> 0. As I discussed before, this inﬂuence acts as a
countervailing force to the ﬁrst one, by increasing the attractiveness of disclosures.
The result that, under some conditions, a public policy “biased” in favor of patents
induces -for those who use secrecy - a more aggressive disclosure strategy is supported, at
least partially, by casual evidence:recall the articles cited in the Introduction highlighting
the importance of carefully managed disclosures for strategically protecting intellectual
property. Even more important, they also suggest the increasing relevance of this practice
under the new and more favorable environment to patents installed in 1982 since the
creation, in the US, of the Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.18
Changes in the technical complexity of innovations
How are disclosures aﬀected by the technical complexity of inventions?. Do innovators
use a more aggressive disclosure strategy for relatively “easy” innovations? To formally
answer these questions,one needs to incorporate a measure of te chnical complexity.
To capture the issue of technical complexity - a measure of how “easy” or “diﬃcult”





∂d =0 . This assumption highly simpliﬁes the







18The Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a specialized appellate court to solve patent cases, was
established in 1982 by Congress. The Court’s decisions has been regarded as being widely “pro-patent”.
See for instance, Kortum and Lerner [10]








For any λ, I assume that C(f,d) has the same properties as those discussed earlier. The
idea is that for a more diﬃcult innovation, achieving a given duplication probability is
more costly. Thus more complex innovations can be associated with higher values for
λ. Following this interpretation, λ can be considered the degree of technical complexity.
Assuming that for all λ ∈ [λ
−,
_
λ], the solution to B’s problem is interior, now the (FOC)
that characterize the SPNE are:
0=γ(d;
−
s)∆P + ∆I −Cf(f,d)
MBd = −γd(d,
−






Using these equations, it is easy to show the following proposition.
Proposition 6. An increase in the technical complexity of the innovation causes the
equilibrium level of disclosures d∗ to diminish.
Proof: See the Appendix.
A higher λ triggers two diﬀerent and reinforcing eﬀects. On the beneﬁt side, B will
react by devoting fewer resources to duplication activities because her rediscovery cost
increases. Therefore, by diminishing the threat of duplication, an increase in the technical
complexity of innovations weakens the importance of disclosures to dissuade patenting
activities. On the other hand, the marginal cost of disclosing is also higher, and the
reason is simply that the enabling eﬀect of disclosures becomes more important for “diﬃ-
cult” innovations. In other words, facing a more diﬃcult technical problem, the marginal
contribution to B of a given amount of knowledge, contained in the disclosure, is now
enhanced.
255 Total Surplus Maximizing Disclosures
If the disclosing ﬁrm’s goal were to maximize (expected) total surplus, what would be
the optimal disclosure level? Would this “social”disclosure level be greater than the
equilibrium one? A natural conjecture is that the private level of disclosure is smaller
than the “social”one: knowledge as a pure public good should be shared completely
between the ﬁrms. Although the intuition seems appealing, the argument is not correct.
In general, it is impossible to obtain a deﬁnite answer to the above questions and in
equilibrium there may be too much or too little disclosure.
To obtain a better understanding of the divergences between private and “social”
disclosures is useful to introduce the following concepts. I denote the situation in which
both ﬁrms use the innovation as a duopoly (D) and the case in which only one ﬁrm exploits
the new technology as a monopoly (M). Notice that the monopoly case is perfectly
compatible with both ﬁrms competing in the downstream market: the word monopoly is
used here to emphasize that only one ﬁrm uses the innovation.
Let TSi and CSi for i ∈ {D,M} be total surplus and consumer surplus respectively.






[(1 − f)TSM + f{γ(d;
−





(f,d) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1] : γ(d;
−
s)∆P + ∆I −Cf (f,d)=0
￿
Two observations are important to understand the problem. First, in this formulation,
the disclosing ﬁrm maximizes total surplus net of duplication costs. This is done to
acknowledge that duplication activities involves a positive additional development cost.
Second, notice that in the “social” problem, the “benevolent” ﬁrm still considers that
duplication activities are performed bya proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm. Therefore, now the ﬁrm
chooses a disclosure level to maximize (expected) total surplus taking into account the
same constraints as those considered in the private case. Thus, this formulation is best
26interpreted as a kind of constrained optimum.








{Cf (f,d) − (1 −γ(d;
−
s))(TSD −TSM)}
The following proposition is a direct consequence of manipulating equations (4) and
(5).
Proposition 7. The “social” beneﬁt and cost of disclosing are related to the private
ones as follows:
a) SMBd = MBd − Cd − fγd(d;
−
s){(CSD −CSM) −(π21 −π22)} ≶ MBd




s))(CSD −CSM) <MC d.19
Proposition 7 shows that the “social” marginal cost of disclosing is always smaller
than the private one. The diﬀerence between the two comes from the fact that disclosures
increase the duplication probability and when B does not get a patent - an event that
occurs withprobability 1−γ(d;
−
s) - both ﬁrms use the innovation in the market competition
game. This results in a higher consumer surplus, because CSM <C S D. The disclosing
ﬁrm does not consider this eﬀect when deciding her optimal disclosure strategy because
it does not capture the (expected) positive spillovers that disclosures have on consumers.
On the beneﬁt side, there are two sources ofdivergences between private and “social”
values. First, the disclosing ﬁrm imposes a positive externality by reducing the cost to B
ofobtaining a given duplication probability, −Cd. And second, for a given f, higher disclo-
sures diminish the probability of patenting and the “social” solution requires to consider
the (expected) changes in consumer surplus and proﬁts resulting from the modiﬁcation in
the market structure. In equilibrium, the disclosing ﬁrm does not take into account neither
19These results are obtained by following simple algebraic manipulations and I omit the formal proof.
27the modiﬁcation in the consumer surplus nor the change in the proﬁts of her competitor
due to the alteration in the market structure.
If (CSD − CSM) − (π21 − π22) > 0,t h e nSMBd >M B d and therefore dW >d ∗.
However, as the following example illustrates, it is entirely possible that (CSD −CSM)−
(π21 −π22) < 0.
Example 2
Consider a Cournot duopoly game with linear inverse demand function P = A − Q.
The innovation reduces the cost of producing the good from c to c − σ for σ>0 and
A>c . Then π21 = (9)−1(A+2 σ − c)2, π22 = (9)−1(A+ σ − c)2, CSM = 2
9(A + σ
2 − c)2
and CSD = 2





2σ2 +( A −c)σ}. Finally, (CSD − CSM) − (π21 − π22)=−(6)
−1 σ2 < 0.
Therefore, in general, the equilibrium may involve too much or too little disclosure as
the following proposition summarizes.
Proposition 8. Suppose that in equilibrium disclosures are partial, i.e. d∗ ∈ (0,1).







SMBd − SMCd ≶ 0.20
A particular and interesting case to examine is that of a “drastic” innovation , that
is an innovation such that π12 = 0 and therefore TSM = TSD. Are “social” disclosures
in this situation smaller than the private ones?. A natural intuition is that given the
total surplus does not change whether duplication is a success or not, disclosures have
no “social” beneﬁts but only eﬀects on the distribution of property rights between the
ﬁrms. Following this reasoning, an appealing conjecture is that in equilibrium there is
too much disclosure. Nevertheless this intuition is incorrect because given that B will
invest in duplication activities, disclosures reduce the private cost to B of achieving any
duplication probability.
20Also at d∗, the following constrain must hold γ(d;
−
s)∆P +∆ I − Cf (f,d)=0
28Using Proposition 7, at d∗, SMBd −SMCd = −Cd +fγd(d;
−
s)(π21 − π22) ≶ 0. Thus
if the negative pecuniary external eﬀect that the disclosing ﬁrm imposes on her competi-
tor, fγd(d;
−
s)(π21 − π22), is smaller - in absolute value - than the technological positive
externality, −Cd, then the equilibrium involves too little disclosure. Finally, notice that if
at d∗, −Cd = −fγd(d;
−
s)(π21 −π22) then the two opposing external eﬀects cancel out and
the private level of disclosure equals the social one, that is d∗ = dW.
6 Conclusions
In this paper I examined the defensive maneuvers that owners of trade secrets employ to
mitigate the risks of patenting activities conducted by subsequent inventors. In particular,
my focus was on the decision of a trade secret owner concerning disclosures of an innovation
to invalidate potential future patents for similar competing technologies.
In a simple duopoly framework I studied the links between several innovation charac-
teristics and the properties of equilibrium disclosures. One important economic dimension
of innovations is their proﬁtability. My model shows that, under some circumstances, more
proﬁtable innovations are more aggressively disclosed. Innovations are also distinguished
by their technical complexity. In this case, I found that, for more complex innovations,
the strategic use of disclosures is considerably debilitated. In addition, disclosures are
aﬀected by patent law and in particular by the rights of potential patentees to exclude
“prior”inventors. My results suggest that an strengthening of these rights does not nec-
essarily lead to less disclosure: a “pro-patent” policy may increase the importance of this
practice to protect innovations.
I also showed, by comparing the equilibrium level of disclosure with the level that
maximizes (expected) total surplus, that in equilibrium there may be too much or too
little disclosure. The result that, under some circumstances, there is too much disclo-
sure contradicts the natural conjecture that knowledge, as a pure public good, should be
completely shared between the ﬁrms.
Several interesting extensions and connected ideas to this work remain to be studied
29in future research. First, in the context of sequential innovations, disclosure - through
patents - of interim ﬁndings is a key ingredient to decrease the social cost of future in-
novations. Without proper incentives, ﬁrms, that also pursue future discoveries, may be
reluctant to disclose “intermediate” innovations. The optimal design of a patent law that
potentially allows ﬁrst inventors to appropriate a share of other’s subsequent innovators
deserves additional research eﬀorts. Second, the link between the economic proﬁtability of
innovations - or innovation “size” - and the choice of intellectual property protection when
ﬁrst inventors can be excluded by subsequent innovators is also a topic to be explored in
future research.
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(b) The location family of cdfs is stochastically increasing in d if d1 >d 2 ⇒ GV (s−d1)
is stochastically greater than GV (s− d2). Given any d ∈ [0,1], we know that
=0 for x<d+a
GS(x|d)=GV (x − d) for d+ a ≤ x ≤ d +b
=1 for d+ b<x
Consider the following cases: (1) x ≤ d2+a ⇒ x ≤ d1+a ⇒ GS(x|d1)=GS(x|d2)=0 ;
(2) x ≥ d1 + b ⇒ x ≥ d2 + b ⇒ GS(x|d1)=GS(x|d2)=1 ; (3) d2 + a<x<d 1 + a ⇒
GS(x|d1)=0and GS(x|d2) > 0 ⇒ GS(x|d1) <G S(x|d2); (4) d2 + b<x<d 1 + b ⇒
GS(x|d1) < 1 and GS(x|d2) =1⇒ GS(x|d1) <G S(x|d2); (5) d1 + a<x<d 2 + b ⇒
GS(x|d2)=GS(x|d1)+[ GS(d1 +a|d2) − GS(d2 +a|d2)] ⇒ GS(x|d1) <G S(x|d2) ￿
Proof of Lemma 2. Part (a) follows from the satisfaction of the condition for the
implicit function theorem, namely that Cff ￿= 0. Part (b) follows from the characteriza-
tion of the ﬁrst order comparative static eﬀects of the exogenous variables, i.e. d,π and


























(π21 − π22) > 0 ￿
Proof of Lemma 3. Part (a) follows from the comparative statics of d on f and






= (Cff)−1[γdd(π21 −π22) −Cfdd] > 0
Because Cfdd < 0 and γdd ≥ 0 ￿
Proof of Theorem 1.(a) Notice that the constrained set K is non-empty, closed and
bounded. That K is non-empty follows from the fact that for all d ∈ [0,1] there exists
an (unique) f that solves ﬁrm B’s problem. K is closed because γ(d;
−
s) and Cf (f,d)
31are continuous functions of d and f . And it is also bounded because both f and d ∈
[0,1]. Therefore K is a non-empty compact set. Then, given that EUA(f,d)=[ ( 1−
f)π21 +fRA(d,π12,π 22,
−
s) ]:[ 0 ,1] ×[0,1] → R++ is a continuous function of d and f,b y
Weierstrass’s theorem, the problem of the disclosing ﬁrm has a solution.
(b) Given Lemma 2, the constrained set can be written as
K =
￿




By part a) of the theorem there exists a pair (d0,f0) such that
EUA((d0,f 0)) = Max{EUA(d,f):( d,f) ∈ K}
Now deﬁne u∗ = EUA((d0,f 0)). Assume that there exists a (d1,f 1) ∈ K such that
d1 ￿= d0 and u∗ = EUA((d1,f 1)). Given a 0 <θ<1, deﬁne θ(d0,f 0)+( 1 − θ)(d1,f 1).
Then by quasiconcavity, EUA(θd0+(1−θ)d1,θf 0+(1−θ)f1) ≥ u∗. However, notice that
corresponding to θd0+(1− θ)d1, there is a unique f given by f = h(θd0+(1−θ)d1;.) such
that (θd0 +(1−θ)d1,h(θd0 +(1−θ)d1;.)) ∈ K.T h e nh(θd0+(1−θ)d1;.) <θ f 0+(1−θ)f1
because by Lemma 3 h(d;.) is a strictly convex function of d. Finally, because EUA(f,d)
is a monotonically decreasing function of f,
EUA(θd0 +(1−θ)d1,h(θd0 +( 1− θ)d1;.)) >
EUA(θd0 +(1−θ)d1,θ,f 0 +(1−θ),f 1) ≥ u∗
This last result, by contradicting the initial assumption that the pair (d0,f 0) is an equi-
librium, implies uniqueness ￿
Proof of Proposition 1. The Lagrangian function corresponding to the problem of
the disclosing ﬁrm is:











s)(π22 − π12)− η{γd(d;
−
s)(π21 − π22)− Cfd (f,d)} +(µ1 −µ2)=0
FOCf : −[(π21 − π22)+γ(d;
−
s)(π22 − π12)] + ηCff(f,d)=0
FOCη : −γ(d;
−
s)(π21 −π22) −(π22 −π12)+Cf (f,d)=0
FOCµ1 : d ≥ 0,µ 1 ≥ 0 with complementary slackness.
FOCµ2 :( 1−d) ≥ 0,µ 2 ≥ 0 with complementary slackness.
32Then d∗ = 0 ⇒ µ1 > 0,µ 2 =0 . From FOCd and FOCf i tm u s tb et h a ta td = 0,
−fγd(d;
−












s)(π22 −π12)+µ1 = fd[(π21 −π22)+γ(d;
−
s)(π22 −π12)]
Dividing both sides by −γd(d;
−
















s)(π21 − π22)+( π22 − π12) −Cf (f,d) ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. Analogous to that of Proposition 1
Proof of Corollary 1. In an interior equilibrium d∗ ∈ (0,1) and (µ1,µ 2)=( 0 ,0).














s,π) ≡ (π21 − π22)+ γ(d,
−






The suﬃcient SOC that must be satisﬁed close to any regular maximum is
























where g = γ(d;
−
s)(π21−π22)−Cf (f,d). Using the FOC, assumption 4 and Lemma 2 and
333, it can be verify that detM > 0 if and only if
(Cff)2{fγdd(π22 −π12)+fddΠ(d,
−
s,π)+2 γd(π22 −π12)fd} > 0









s,π) + γd(π22 −π12)fd
Therefore,




















s)(π22 − π12)− η{γd(d;
−
s)(π21 − π22) −Cfd (f,d)} =0
F3(η,d,f,π,
−
s) = −[(π21 −π22)+γ(d;
−
s)(π22 −π12)] +ηCff (f,d)=0
Then if at the equilibrium det
∂(F1,F2,F3)
∂(η,d,f) ￿= 0, the conditions for the implicit function
theorem are satisﬁed. Notice that det
∂(F1,F2,F3)
∂(η,d,f) =d e tM and detM must be greater than




























































] ≶ 0 ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. Using the implicit functiontheorem, the comparative statics

























(π22 −π12)} ≶ 0































(π22 − π12)] > 0 ￿
Proof of Proposition 5. The sensitivity of disclosures, arounda “regular”equilibrium,



































)(π22 −π12)} ≶ 0





























)(π22 −π12)] ≶ 0 ￿
Proof of Proposition 6. The introduction of the degree of technical complexity










s)(π22 −π12) − η{γd(d;
−
s)(π21 − π22)− λCfd (f,d)} =0
F3(η,d,f,π,
−
s,λ) = −[(π21 −π22)+γ(d;
−
s)(π22 −π12)]+ ηλCff(f,d)=0




















































































] < 0 ￿
37